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Case No. 20100004 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
SCOTT C. WADSWORTH, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for sexual exploitation of a minor, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5a-3 (Supp. 2001), 
unlawful sexual activity with a minor, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-401 (1999), and enticing a minor over the Internet, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401(1) (Supp. 2003). This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court violate Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to his 
counsel of choice when it refused to permit his counsel of record to withdraw 
until other counsel appeared in the case? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard of Review. A trial court's denial of an attorney's motion to 
withdraw as counsel is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Utah R. Crim. P. 
36 (providing that "an attorney may not withdraw as counsel of record in 
criminal cases without the approval of the court"). "However, courts . . . have 
no discretion to allow a violation of a defendant's constitutional right to 
counsel." State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 381 (Utah App. 1997). "Absent special 
circumstances, a 'defendant's choice of retained counsel must be respected.'" 
State v. Barber, 2009 UT App 91, If 17, 206 P.3d 1233 (citation omitted). 
2. Did Defendant knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty to the three 
charges in this case? 
Standard of Review. "A district court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a ( 
guilty plea involves both factual and legal determinations, and thus invites 
multiple standards of review." State v. Lovell, 2011 UT 36, ! 5, 690 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 13. The trial court's ultimate ruling on the motion is reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion, and the court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. 
However, " 'the ultimate question of whether the [trial] court strictly complied 
with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness.'" Id. (quoting State v. Beckstead, 
2006 UT 42, | 8,140 P.3d 1288). Moreover," [a]n ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim is a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Lenkart, 2011 UT 27, f 20, i 
-2-
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Utah Adv. Rep. . The trial court's underlying factual findings are reviewed 
for clear error. Id. The court's legal conclusions, including its application of the 
law to the facts, is reviewed for correctness. Id. But in doing so, "[judicial 
scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum A: U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 
(1999) & Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004); and Utah R. Crim. P. 11. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of Facts. 
In the summer of 2003, Defendant—who was 34 years old — met 15-year-
old A. V. on the Internet. Using the Internet, he sent A. V. child pornography and 
arranged to meet with her for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity. When 
the two met, Defendant "kissed and fondled [A.V/s] breast" and "she 
performed oral sex on [him]/' Defendant admitted to these facts on October 22, 
2004 during a plea colloquy and in his Statement of Defendant in Support of 
Guilty Plea ("plea affidavit"). See R71:9-ll; R54-61 (Addendum B). 
-3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. Summary of proceedings. 
Defendant was charged by Information with enticing a minor over the 
Internet, unlawful sexual activity with a minor, sexual abuse of a minor, and 
twenty counts of dealing in harmful material to a minor. R.l-8. At Defendant's 
initial appearance, the district court appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defender's 
Association (LDA) to represent him. R10-14. But days later, Defendant retained 
private counsel — Barton Warren—to represent him. See R20. On the date of the 
scheduled preliminary hearing, the State made a plea offer to.Defendant and the 
case was set for a change of plea hearing on May 7,2004. See R36-37a,38-39a,43.1 
Second legal opinion regarding State's plea offer 
Defendant chose not to plead guilty at the May 7 change of plea hearing, 
and the case was set for a two-day jury trial to begin on August 10, 2004. See 
R40-42. Defendant advised his attorney, Mr. Warren, "that it was his intention 
to at least seek a second opinion and retain other counsel" before accepting the 
plea offer. R192 (Addendum C): 3. Three weeks later, Defendant retained 
attorney Susanne Gustin. R99 (Addendum D):^fl; accord R192:3-5. On June 17, 
2004, she provided Defendant with a written, legal opinion of the case, R99:^[6, 
1
 The district court clerk did not paginate the third pages of the minute 
entries for the February 26 and April 9 hearings. The State will thus cite those 
pages as "R37a" and "R39a" respectively. 
-4-
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and concurred with Warren's recommendation that Defendant accept the State's 
plea offer, R43:fl. 
Counsels' attempts to clarify status of legal representation 
A day or two after receiving Ms. Gustin's letter, Defendant spoke with her 
about representing him at trial. R99:^ f 1; R192:5-7. By early July 2004, Ms. Gustin 
notified Defendant that she was "not going to be able to represent" him in the 
case, but said she would provide the names and phone numbers of attorneys 
who might. R192:6; R99:^|7. When she did not hear back from Defendant, she 
notified Mr. Warren of the situation; Mr. Warren left several telephone messages 
with Defendant, but Defendant did not respond. See R99:f 8; R192:4. On July 12, 
2004, Mr. Warren wrote Defendant a letter asking that he "let [him] know what 
was going on" because "[i]t was [his] understanding that [he] was going to be 
replaced as his attorney." R192:4. 
After hearing nothing from Defendant, Mr. Warren wrote a second letter 
on July 20, 2004, again asking that Defendant contact him to let him know his 
intentions. R192:4. That same day, the State filed a stipulated motion to 
continue the trial. R43-44 (Addendum E). The motion advised the court that 
Defendant had not been in contact with Mr. Warren or Ms. Gustin; that Ms. 
Gustin had "indicated that she will not represent [Defendant] at a trial in this 
case"; that Mr. Warren had "indicated that he will not be prepared to proceed to 
-D-
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trial as . . . scheduled due to a lack of contact with [Defendant]"; and that the 
State could not proceed to trial as scheduled, because a key witness would be 
out of town. R43-44. 
August 6, 2004 pretrial conference 
At a pretrial conference on August 6, 2004, the district court granted the 
State's stipulated motion for a continuance and rescheduled the trial for October 
26,2004. See R46-47; R192:8-9. At the pretrial conference, Defendant explained 
his desire that Ms. Gustin represent him at trial. See R192:5-6. The court told 
Defendant that Ms. Gustin had communicated to the court that "under no 
circumstances" would she represent him in the case. See R192:5-6. The court 
admonished Defendant to "£traighten[ ] out" his legal representation or he 
would be representing himself, to which Defendant responded, "I don't want to 
do that." R192:8. Upon hearing this exchange, Mr. Warren moved for leave to 
withdraw as counsel for Defendant. R192:8. The court denied the request and 
ruled that it would not allow Mr. Warren to withdraw "until Ms. Gustin or 
somebody else makes an appearance." R192:8-9. 
-6-
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October 22, 2004 change of plea hearing 
In the months that followed, no other attorney appeared as counsel for 
Defendant. See R46-53. At the October 22,2004 pretrial conference, Mr. Warren 
appeared on behalf of Defendant. See R62-63,71. At that time, pursuant to a 
plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to all three charges set forth in an 
Amended Information: (1) sexual exploitation of a minor, a second degree 
felony; (2) unlawful sexual activity with a minor, a third degree felony; and 
(3) enticing a minor over the Internet, a class A misdemeanor. See R51-63,71. 
Before accepting the pleas, the district court conducted a rule 11 plea colloquy 
and received Defendant's signed plea affidavit, which was also signed by Mr. 
Warren as Defendant's attorney. See R71:9-ll,13; R54-61. 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas 
Following his plea hearing, but before sentencing, Defendant retained 
Peter Goodall of the law firm, Yengich, Rich & Xaiz, who then filed a timely 
motion to withdraw Defendant's guilty pleas. R.64-69. After the parties briefed 
and argued the matter, the district court denied the motion in a signed 
memorandum decision issued on February 8, 2005. R74-128 (Addendum F). 
The court ordered Defendant to report to Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) 
for the preparation of a presentence investigation report and scheduled 
sentencing for April 8, 2005. R127. 
-7-
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Sentencing—5 years later 
Defendant did not appear for sentencing and a $20,000 warrant was 
issued for his arrest. R129-133. More than five years later, Defendant was 
stopped for a traffic violation and arrested on the outstanding warrant. R.136-
37. The district court thereafter sentenced Defendant to concurrent prison terms 
of one-to-fifteen years for sexual exploitation of a minor, zero-to-five years for 
unlawful sexual activity with a minor, and 365 days for enticing a minor over 
the Internet. R.156-58. Defendant timely appealed. R.159-60. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. Within days after his 
initial appearance, Defendant retained Barton Warren to represent him in this 
case. After Mr. Warren recommended that Defendant accept the State's plea 
offer, Defendant retained Susanne Gustin, who reviewed the evidence and 
provided a second legal opinion, also recommending that Defendant accept the 
plea offer. However, Defendant asked that Ms. Gustin represent him at trial. 
She refused. Although Defendant wished to have Ms. Gustin represent him at 
trial, he did not want to represent himself. Accordingly, when Mr. Warren 
asked for leave to withdraw, the district court denied the motion, ruling that he 
could not do so until Ms. Gustin or someone else appeared. Where Defendant 
did not want to represent himself and had not hired another attorney to 
-8-
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represent him, the district court's denial of the motion to withdraw did not 
deprive Defendant of his right to counsel of choice. Moreover, nothing in the 
record suggested that Defendant was entitled to retained counsel. 
II. Guilty pleas. Contrary to his claim on appeal, Defendant knowingly 
and voluntarily pled guilty to the charges in this case. Because he pled guilty 
after the 2003 amendment to the plea withdrawal statute, he is required to show 
that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary. He has failed to do so. 
The record demonstrates that, contrary to Defendant's claim, he was not forced 
to plead guilty by virtue of the court's refusal to allow7 Mr. Warren to withdraw7. 
Had Defendant wished to hire different counsel, the record shows that he had 
the funds to do so. Moreover, Defendant attested at the plea hearing that his 
plea was voluntary, of his own free will and choice, that he was not subject to 
undue influence, and that he was satisfied with the advice of his attorney. 
Moreover, this Court should not review Defendant's rule 11(e) claim because 
any error was invited. Additionally, counsel did not provide ineffective 
assistance of counsel in stipulating that rule 11 was fully complied with. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO HIS COUNSEL OF CHOICE 
Defendant argues that the district court denied his right to his counsel of 
choice because he had "fired" Mr. Warren and "the public defenders' office was 
counsel that was qualified, able and willing to represent [him]." Aplt. Brf. at 22-
30. He contends that "the court's insistence that [he] continue to be represented 
by someone not of his choice was unjustified and in violation of [his] Sixth 
Amendment right to choice of counsel." Aplt. Brf. at 26. He claims that he is 
thus "entitled to have his guilty pleas vacated and a new trial ordered." Aplt. 
Brf. at 29. This claim lacks merit. 
A. Defendants enjoy a right to choice of counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that 
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the r i gh t . . . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const, amend. VI. Thus, a criminal 
defendant who cannot afford an attorney has "the right to state-appointed 
" The State agrees that because the deprivation of a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel of choice is structural error under United States v. 
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), a defendant's guilty plea does not preclude 
him from challenging on appeal an alleged denial of his right to counsel of 
choice. See United States v. Smith, 618 F.3d 657, 663 (7th Or. 2010); United States 
v. Sanchez Guerrero, 546 U.S. 328, 332 (5th Or. 2008). 
-10-
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counsel." Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507,2516 (2011). Another "element of this 
right is the right of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to 
choose who will represent him/ ' United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 
144 (2006). And "[although not stated in the [Sixth] Amendment in so many 
words, the right to self-representation—to make one's own defense personally — 
is [also] necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment/- Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806,819 (1975). At issue in this case is the Sixth Amendment 
right to choice of counsel. 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice is not absolute. See id. at 
151; Wlieat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (holding that "[t]he Sixth 
Amendment right to choose one's own counsel is circumscribed in several 
important respects"). The accused does not have the right to be represented by 
a person "who is not a member of the bar," or who does not otherwise meet a 
court's "criteria . . . to argue before [it]." Id. at 151-52. Counsel of choice "must 
be free of conflicts or other ethical limitations" — such conflicts cannot be 
waived. State v. Barber, 2009 UT App 91, f 42, 206 P.3d 1223 (citing Wheat, 486 
U.S. at 159). And, of course, a defendant may not insist on representation by an 
attorney he cannot afford or who for other reasons declines to represent the 
defendant." Wlieat, 486 U.S. at 159. 
-11-
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The right to counsel of choice is also circumscribed by the practical 
considerations of the trial proceedings. As explained in Gonzalez-Lopez, a trial 
court has "wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the 
needs of fairness and against the demands of its calendar." 548 U.S. at 152. A 
trial court may thus deny a defendant's request to substitute counsel if doing so 
"would obstruct the orderly procession of the case, for example, if 'a defendant 
attempts to substitute counsel at the eleventh hour or in mid-trial.'" Barber, 2009 
UT App 91, f 43 (quoting United States v. Panzardi-Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813,816 (1st 
Cir. 1987)). In such a case, refusal to allow substitution of counsel is appropriate 
unless the defendant "show[s] good cause [for the change in counsel,] such as a 
conflict of interest, a breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable dispute 
with his attorney.'" Id. (quoting Panzardi-Alvarez, 816 F.2d at 816) (brackets in 
original). 
B. The district court did not deprive Defendant of his right to choice 
of counsel. 
Contrary to Defendant's claim on appeal, the district court in this case did 
not deny him his right to counsel of choice. Indeed, there was never a motion 
before the court—in writing or orally —to substitute Defendant's attorney of 
record, Barton Warren, with a different attorney. And the district court never 
suggested that it would not allow such a substitution. To the contrary, the court 
-12-
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recognized that it would permit substitute counsel upon his or her appearance 
in court. That never happened. 
Defendant claims that the district court denied his right to counsel of 
choice at the August 6, 2004 pretrial conference, when it denied Mr. Warren's 
motion to withdraw. See Aplt. Brf. at 22-23. The motion to withdraw, however, 
was not made concurrent with an appearance of new counsel, nor did 
Defendant indicate that he had retained or otherwise identified a new attorney 
willing to represent him, or suggest that he could no longer afford to hire a new 
attorney. 
At Defendant's initial appearance on December 22,2003, the district court 
appointed LDA as Defendant's counsel in the case. See 11-14. But just days 
later, Defendant retained Barton Warren to represent him instead. See R20-24. 
The State made a plea offer to Defendant on the day of the scheduled 
preliminary hearing. See R43:^|l. Mr. Warren recommended that Defendant 
accept the offer and a change of plea hearing was scheduled for May 7,2004. See 
R36-39; R43:5fl. Defendant, however, chose not to enter a plea at the May 7 
hearing and trial was scheduled for August 10, 2004. See R40-42. He thereafter 
retained Ms. Susanne Gustin, who, on June 17,2004, provided Defendant with a 
written, legal opinion on the case. R99; R192:3,5. 
-13-
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Like Mr. Warren, Ms. Gustin also recommended that Defendant accept 
the plea offer from the State, R43:^[l, but Defendant requested that she represent 
him at trial, see R99:^[7. There is some dispute as to whether Ms. Gustin had 
agreed to also represent Defendant at trial, and, at some point, Defendant 
conveyed to Mr. Warren that he "was going to be replaced as his attorney/' 
R192:4.3 But as conceded by Defendant below, in early July 2004 Ms. Gustin 
"told [him] . . . there's no way 111 be able to go to trial" in the case due to her 
pregnancy. R192:6. Ms. Gustin so notified Mr. Warren—Defendant's attorney 
of record. R192:4. Thereafter, Mr. Warren attempted to contact Defendant on 
multiple occasions — by telephone and letter — to find out "what was going on," 
but Defendant did not respond. R192:4. 
At a pretrial conference four days before the August 10, 2004 Mai date, 
the district court was made aware of Defendant's desire to retain Ms. Gustin as 
his trial counsel. See R192. The court, however, advised Defendant that Gustin 
had notified it that "under no circumstances was she representing [Defendant] 
in this case." R192:5. The court admonished Defendant to "straightenj ] out" 
his representation or he would be representing himself, to which Defendant 
3
 Defendant maintains that his paid retainer covered trial representation, 
R192:6, but Ms. Gustin asserts that she was retained "for the limited scope of 
reviewing [the] plea offer he had received from the state" and that "no 
agreement was ever reached" to retain her services as trial counsel, R99:^fl,7. 
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responded, "I don't want to do that." R192:8. His counsel of record, Mr. 
Warren, then moved to withdraw as Defendant's counsel given Defendant's 
stated desire at that time to hire a different attorney. See R192:8. The court, 
however, denied his motion, ruling that he could not withdraw "until Ms. 
Gustin or somebody else makes an appearance" in the case. R192:8-9. 
The district court's denial of Mr. Warren's motion for leave to withdraw 
was well within its discretion. See State v. Dolierty, 29 Utah 2d 320,321,509 P.2d 
351, 352 (1973) (recognizing that trial counsel has discretion in granting or 
denying a motion to withdraw as counsel). Indeed, the rules specifically 
provide that "an attorney may not withdraw as counsel of record in criminal 
cases without the approval of the court." Utah R. Crim. P. 35(a)(1). As this case 
demonstrates, the rule exists with good reason. 
As noted, Defendant made it clear to the district court that he did not 
want to represent himself in the case. R192:8. And although he had attempted 
to secure Ms. Gustin's services to represent him at trial instead of Mr. Warren, 
she had refused. Defendant admitted at trial that Ms. Gustin told him in early 
July that she would not represent him due to her pregnancy. R192:6. 
Thereafter, Ms. Gustin so notified Mr. Warren, who tried to then contact 
Defendant, but without success. R192:4. She also notified the district court a 
month later at the August 6 pretrial conference and the court, in turn, reaffirmed 
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that position with Defendant. R192:5. Under these circumstances, it would 
have been an abuse of discretion for the court to permit Mr. Warren's 
withdrawal. 
When Defendant appeared before the court two and one-half months later 
for the final pretrial conference on October 22,2004, Mr. Warren appeared with 
him as his attorney. See R59,62. And, at that time, Mr. Warren represented to 
the court that they had reached a resolution— that Defendant would plead 
guilty to the charges in an amended information. R71:2. The district court 
specifically asked Defendant whether that representation by Mr. Warren was 
correct, to which Defendant responded, "Yes, sir." R71:3. During the two and 
one-half month interim between the August 6 pretrial conference and the 
October 22 plea hearing, no other attorney made an appearance on behalf of 
Defendant. See R48-63. Moreover, Defendant did not suggest at the October 22 
plea hearing that he was dissatisfied with the representation of Mr. Warren. See 
R71. To the contrary, he attested in his signed plea affidavit that he was 
"satisfied with the advice and assistance of [his] attorney." R58. 
As the foregoing demonstrates, at no time was Defendant denied his 
constitutional right to counsel of choice. Although he was initially appointed 
LDA, he quickly retained his then counsel of choice, Mr. Warren, to represent 
him. The court honored that choice. It is true that Defendant later desired to 
-16-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
replace Mr. Warren with Ms. Gustin as his trial counsel. But she declined to do 
so. The law is settled that a defendant has no right to counsel who is not willing 
to assume representation. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 155 (holding that a 
defendant's right to choice of counsel is "[l]imit[ed].. . to those attorneys who 
are willing, available, and eligible to represent the defendant") (emphasis added); 
Barber, 2009 UT App 91, \ 42 (holding that defendant's counsel of choice "must 
be willing to represent the defendant"). 
Defendant now suggests, for the first time on appeal, that LDA was his 
counsel of choice. See Aplt. Brf. at 22 (asserting that "the public defenders' office 
was qualified, able and willing counsel that could have replaced Mr. Warren"); 
27 (same). Defendant, however, never made such a claim below. Having failed 
to preserve this argument, Defendant cannot prevail on appeal unless he "can 
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 11,10 P.3d 346. He has argued neither on appeal, 
and the Court should thus refuse to review this claim. See State v. Pledger, 896 
P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (refusing to address unpreserved claim where 
defendant argued neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances on appeal). 
In any event, nothing in the record supports a claim that Defendant 
wished to substitute Mr. Warren with LDA. As noted, LDA represented 
Defendant for a brief period at the beginning of the case. However, Defendant 
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quickly replaced LD A with Mr. Warren. Later, he asked Ms. Gustin to represent 
him in the case. When she refused, Defendant did not seek representation by 
LDA. Instead, he sought from Ms. Gustin the names of other private attorneys 
that might represent him at trial. See R192:6. And when Defendant later moved 
to withdraw his guilty pleas, he retained a third attorney — Peter Goodall, from 
Yengich, Rich & Xaiz. In short, but for the brief period at the beginning of the 
case, Defendant's counsel of choice was never LDA. ~ 
Defendant argues that when he became dissatisfied with Mr. Warren, the 
district court had an obligation to again inform him of the Sixth Amendment 
right to court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants. See Aplt. Brf. at 26. 
This argument fails for two reasons. First, Defendant cites no authority that 
supports such a proposition. And second, the right to court-appointed counsel 
applies only to those criminal defendants who cannot afford an attorney. See 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (holding that the right to court-
appointed counsel extends to both federal and state criminal defendaints who 
are "unable to employ counsel"). Despite Defendant's belated claim of 
indigence, he demonstrated a remarkable ability to hire attorney after attorney 
throughout the proceedings. First, he retained Mr. Warren; then, Ms. Gustin; 
and finally, after entering his plea, Mr. Goodall. Thus, any alleged error in not 
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re-advising Defendant of the right to appointed counsel would be harmless 
because the record is clear that Defendant could afford to retain counsel. 
* * * 
In sum, the district court at all times honored Defendant's right to counsel 
of his choice. After LDA was appointed, Defendant quickly replaced them with 
Mr. Warren. Later, the court did not block his attempt to retain Ms. Gustin. It 
simply ruled that until she or someone else entered an appearance, Mr. Warren 
needed to remain as counsel of record. Defendant chose to retain Mr. Warren, 
expressed his satisfaction with Mr. Warren's representation, and entered guilty 
pleas under the plea agreement. Thereafter, Mr. Goodall appeared on behalf of 
Defendant/without impediment from the court. Defendant's claim thus fails. 
IL 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEAS WERE KNOWING AND 
VOLUNTARY AND WERE TAKEN IN STRICT COMPLIANCE 
WITH RULE 11, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Defendant also argues that his pleas "were not entered in strict 
compliance with Rule 11 and were otherwise not voluntary/' Aplt. Brf. at 30. 
He argues that the district court improperly denied his motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas because (1) he was "forced" to keep Mr. Warren as his counsel in 
the case, thereby rendering his plea involuntary, see Aplt. Brf. at 43-47, and 
(2) the district court did not strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, see Aplt. Brf. at 31-43. These claims likewise fail. 
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In State v. Ruiz, this Court reaffirmed that "trial courts should liberally 
grant presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas." 2009 UT App 121, % 22, 
210 P.3d 955, cert, granted, 221 P.3d 837 (Utah 2009).4 But as recognized in Ruiz, 
" '[t]his liberal-approach language . . . is directed to the trial court's exercise of 
discretion/ " and " 'in no way alters' " the requirements for the withdrawal of 
guilty pleas under section 77-13-6 of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure. Id. 
(quoting State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah App. 1992)). 
Before 2003, section 77-13-6 allowed the withdrawal of a guilty plea "only 
upon good cause shown and with leave of the court." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-
6(2)(a) (1994). Under this "good cause" standard, a defendant was not required 
to show that the plea was constitutionally invalid, i.e., that the defendant "did 
not, in fact, enter her pleas in a knowing and voluntary way." See Bluemel v. 
State, 2007 UT 90, ^17,19, 173 P.3d 842. Instead, a defendant could 
"demonstrate good cause to withdraw a guilty plea by merely showing the trial 
court failed to strictly comply with 11(e)" of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. State v. Lovell, 2011 UT 36, f 69, 690 Utah Adv. Rep. 13. So long as 
The holding in Ruiz is currently pending certiorari review by the Utah 
Supreme Court. The State maintains that this "liberal" standard for guilty pleas 
is no longer valid given the 2005 amendment to section 77-13-6, which is 
discussed herein. 
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the challenge to the guilty plea was preserved, harm was "presume[d]." Id. at 
f 45,69.5 
Rule 11(e) —which requires courts to make several enumerated findings 
before accepting a guilty plea —is designed "to ensure that defendants know of 
their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of their decision to 
plead guilty." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^ 11,22 P.3d 1242. Nevertheless, a trial 
court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 does not, in and of itself, render the 
plea unconstitutional, i.e.," 'not knowing and voluntary/ " Bluemel, 2007 UT 90, 
Tf Tf 18 (quoting Salazar v. Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988,992 (Utah 1993)). Thus, 
under section 77-13-6's good cause standard, a defendant was entitled to 
withdraw his or her guilty plea —otherwise constitutionally valid —upon the 
'
vmere[ ] showing" of a violation of the prophylactic provisions of rule 11(e). See 
Lovell, 2011 UT 36, % 69.6 In 2003, this changed. 
In May 2003, section 77-13-6 was amended. That amendment abandoned 
the "good cause" standard for the withdrawal of guilty pleas in favor of the 
5
 The Utah Supreme Court in Lovell appears to hold that the "good cause" 
standard was not replaced until 2005, when rule 11 was amended to include a 
showing of harmless error. See Lovell, 2011 UT 36, % 69. This appears, however, 
to simply be a mistake given the fact that section 77-13-6 was clearly amended in 
2003, not 2005. 
6
 To the extent this Court's opinion in Ruiz suggests otherwise, see Ruiz, 
2009 UT App 121, ^ 21, it is clearly contrary to the holdings of the Utah Supreme 
Court, as discussed. 
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constitutional "knowing and voluntary" standard: "A plea of guilty or no 
contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it 
was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) 
(West 2004). Under this revised standard, therefore, a guilty plea may only be 
withdrawn upon a showing that" 'the guilty plea was in fact not knowing and 
voluntary/" Cf. Bluemel, 2007 UT 90, f 18 (quoting Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992). 
Defendant in this case entered his guilty pleas on October 22, 2004. See 
R54-61,71. Accordingly, the current version of section 77-13-6 imposing a 
constitutional standard for the withdrawal of guilty pleas applies. As such, 
Defendant is "obligated . . . to establish not just that the trial court violated rule 
11, but that [he] did not, in fact, enter [his] pleas in a knowing and voluntary 
way." Cf. Bluemel, 2007 UT 90, f 19 (addressing the constitutional standard as 
applied in post-conviction proceedings). Defendant has failed to make this 
showing. 
A. Defendant's guilty pleas were not rendered involuntary by virtue 
of his unsuccessful efforts to retain other counsel. 
Defendant argues that he "only pleaded guilty because he did not believe 
Mr. Warren would be able to represent his interests at trial and [he] did not 
believe he had another option with regard to his representation." Aplt. Brf. at 
44. He contends that he "was forced to remain represented by Mr. Warren 
despite his lost confidence with his assistance as counsel." Aplt. Brf. at 45. In 
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support of his claim that he was "forced" to remain with Mr. Warren, Defendant 
alleges that "he was unable to afford to hire a new attorney" and the district 
court "was not going to allow him to continue the trial again." Aplt. Brf. at 45-
46. Defendant made the foregoing argument in his motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas. See R66-68,74-84. The district court, however, properly ruled that 
Defendant had demonstrated "no legitimate basis to allow [him] to withdraw 
[his] pleas." R126-27. 
As discussed, nothing in the record at the time of the October 22 plea 
hearing suggests that Defendant could not afford to hire an attorney. Within 
days of his initial appearance, he retained Barton Warren. See R20. Then, after 
Mr. Warren recommended that Defendant accept the State's plea offer, he paid a 
5,000 retainer for Susanne Gustin, who reviewed the evidence and provided 
Defendant with a second opinion. See R99; R192:3-5. At the August 6 pretrial 
conference, Defendant also related to the court that in early July 2004, Ms. 
Gustin had offered to provide the names of other attorneys that might be able to 
represent him instead and that he responded, "that's fine." R192:6. Although 
he complained to the court that she never followed through and that he had 
J. ^ 
paid a "hefty" fee for nothing more than a second opinion, Defendant never 
suggested to the court that he could not afford another attorney. See R192. 
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In light of the foregoing facts, nothing reasonably suggested to the court 
that Defendant could not afford an attorney. Nor did Defendant claim that he 
could not afford an attorney in his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. See R66-
68. His claim of indigence did not arise until two and one-half months after he 
entered his pleas, when his newly retained attorney, Peter Goodall, filed a 
memorandum in support of the motion. See R76; see also R116. This claim, 
however, seems disingenuous where he had now hired a third attorney in the 
case. 
Moreover, the court appropriately admonished Defendant to 
"straighten[ ] out'7 his legal representation, and it continued the trial almost 
three months — more than enough time for Defendant to settle on an attorney. 
See R192:8-9. The record showed that despite repeated efforts by both Mr. 
Warren and Ms. Gustin, Defendant did not contact Mr. Warren for five months 
and Ms. Gustin for a month. See R192:4; R99. In light of this conduct, the court 
appropriately ruled it would not continue the trial based on another last-minute 
claim Defendant has not secured counsel. See R192:9. 
The record also does not show that Defendant had lost confidence in Mr. 
Warren. Although Defendant had attempted to retain Ms. Gustin to represent 
him at trial, the motion that Mr. Warren be given leave to withdraw came from 
Mr. Warren, not Defendant, and appeared to be in response to Defendant's 
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desire to hire Ms. Gustin. See R192:4. Defendant made it clear he did not want 
to represent himself and it was equally clear that Ms. Gustin would not 
represent him. The court thus denied Mr. Warren's motion to withdraw, 
without objection from Defendant. See R192:8-9. While it appears that 
Defendant would rather have had Ms. Gustin represent him, he did not 
otherwise suggest that he had lost confidence in Mr. Warren. See R192. 
Finally, and as recognized by the district court in its memorandum 
decision denying his motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, "there were 
numerous opportunities [at the October 22 plea hearing] for [Defendant] to 
suggest to the Court that his plea was not voluntary, but the record is devoid of 
any such suggestion/7 R126. Instead, when the court asked if he wanted to 
accept the plea offer of the State and plead guilty to the charges in the Amended 
Information, Defendant replied, "Yes, sir/' R71:2-3. Moreover, he admitted to 
the factual basis for the plea and confessed that "it.was absolutely wrong" what 
he did. R71:9-12. And he acknowledged that he had read the plea affidavit and 
understood the rights he was waiving in pleading guilty. R71:13. And in that 
affidavit, he attested that he wTas "entering this plea of [his] own free will and 
choice," that "[n]o force, threats, or unlawful influence of any kind [had] been 
made to get [him] to plead guilty," and that he was "satisfied with the advice 
and assistance of [his] attorney." R58. 
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In sum, the record demonstrates that Defendant was not forced by the 
circumstances to enter his guilty pleas, but pled guilty knowingly and 
voluntarily. See Bolith v. State, 2011 UT App 21, f 4,248 P.3d 1008 (holding that 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty where defendant attested that 
he had not been pressured to plead guilty, confirmed that he was guilty of the 
crimes, and acknowledged the rights he was waiving). 
B. Defendant has not demonstrated that his guilty pleas were not 
knowing and voluntary based on the alleged unpreserved claims 
of rule 11 error. 
Defendant also claims that the district court did not strictly comply with 
rule 11, because (1) "it failed to resolve the conflict [he] had in his choice of 
counsel prior to the entry of the plea," in violation of rule 11(e)(1); and (2) "it 
failed to inform [him] that if he went to trial he would have the ability to compel 
witnesses for his defense," in violation of rule 11(e)(3). Aplt. Brf. at 31-32,34. 
Defendant argues that because the trial court did not strictly comply with rule 
11, the district court "abused its discretion" in denying his motion to withdraw 
his guilty pleas and "this Court must presume harm and. . . reverse." Aplt Brf. 
at 38. These claims also lack merit. 
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1. Defendant did not preserve his rule 11 claims, but 
affirmatively represented that the district court "fully 
complied" with the requirements of rule 11, thereby inviting 
any alleged error. 
Defendant's argument applies section 77-13-6's pre-2003 "good cause" 
standard for preserved claims of rule 11 error. This standard is inapplicable for 
two reasons. First, as explained, Defendant's plea was entered on October 22, 
2004, and therefore, the current, constitutional, "knowing and voluntary" 
standard applies. See supra, at 21-23. And second, Defendant's rule 11 claims 
were not preserved. What's more, Defendant stipulated that the district court 
complied with rule 11. Accordingly, this Court may not reach Defendant's rule 
11 claims on appeal under the invited error doctrine. 
In moving to withdraw his guilty pleas, Defendant did not claim that the 
district court violated rule 11. In his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, 
Defendant argued that they were involuntary because he was unable to 
substitute counsel. See R66-69,74-85; R168. For the reasons explained above, the 
district court properly denied that motion. See supra, at 23-27. In the motion 
itself, Defendant did "submit[ ] . . . that the Court did not comply with the 
mandates of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." R68. But this 
rule 11 claim was conditional pending Mr. Goodall's review of the October 22 
plea hearing: once Mr. Goodall reviewed the recording of the plea hearing, he 
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would " either submit further briefing to the Court regarding [the Rule 11] issue 
or withdraw this argument in its entirety/7 R68. He did the latter. 
Seven weeks after filing the motion, Mr. Goodall submitted a supporting 
memorandum. See R74-85. Nowhere in the memorandum did he contend that 
the district court failed to comply with rule 11. See R74-85. He argued only that 
the pleas were involuntary because Defendant "was unable to substitute 
counsel." See R74-85. Later, at the hearing on the motion, Mr. Goodall 
affirmatively waived any claim that the district court did not comply with rule 
11: "[W]e stipulate that the requirements of Rule 11 were completely complied 
with at the time [Defendant] entered his plea." R168:3 (emphasis added). 
Defendant acknowledges on appeal that his rule 11 claims were not 
preserved below, but claims that "this Court can [nevertheless] reach the merits 
. . . under the plain error doctrine." Aplt. Brf. at 39-40. Ordinarily, an 
unpreserved claim of rule 11 error may be reached on appeal upon a showing of 
plain error. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, f^ 14, 95 P.3d 276. But in this case it 
cannot, because Defendant, through counsel, stipulated that the district court 
"completely complied with" rule 11. R168:8. Having affirmatively represented 
that the district court complied with rule 11, the invited error doctrine bars 
7
 Defendant also filed a supplemental memorandum, which merely 
provided the form of the second page of the retainer agreement used by 
Defendant's second attorney, Ms. Susanne Gustin. See R86-91. 
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Defendant from claiming otherwise on appeal. See State v. Winfteld, 2006 UT 4, f^ 
14,128 P.3d 1171 (holding that it will " decline [ ] to engage in even plain error 
review when 'counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to 
the [trial] court that he or she had no objection to the [proceedings])/ " (citation 
omitted). Because Defendant invited any error, this Court should reject 
Defendant's plain error claim. 
2. Defendant's attorney did not provide constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to challenge 
Defendant's guilty plea based on rule 11 error. 
Alternatively, Defendant argues that Mr. Goodall was constitutionally 
ineffective when he stipulated that the trial court complied with rule 11. See 
Aplt. Brf. at 40-43. This claim also fails. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 
must satisfy the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). First, the defendant must demonstrate "that counsel's performance was 
deficient/7 i.e., that it "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness/' Id. at 
687-88. Second, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's "deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense," i.e., that "there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Id. at 687,694. Ineffective assistance of counsel will not be 
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found unless the defendant "makes both showings/' Id. at 687. Defendant has 
made neither. 
a. Counsel did not perform deficiently in stipulating that 
the district court complied with rule 11 in taking 
Defendant's guilty pleas. 
Defendant argues that rather than stipulating thatthe trial court complied 
with rule 11, his attorney should have instead challenged his guilty pleas under 
rule 11(a) and (e). See Aplt. Brf. at 41-42. This claim fails at the outset because, 
as noted, it is not enough to establish rule 11 error—the defendant must 
demonstrate that he "did not, in fact, enter [his] pleas in a knowing and 
voluntary way." Bluemel, 2007 UT 90, f 19. Because Defendant has not even 
alleged that the rule 11 violations rendered his plea unknowing or involuntary, 
his claim thus fails. 
In any event, a review of the record reveals that the district court strictly 
complied with the requirements of rule 11. Accordingly, any challenge to the 
pleas based on rule 11 would have been futile, and the law is settled that counsel 
does not perform deficiently by failing to raise futile claims. See State v. Kelley, 
2000 UT 41, \26,1 P.3d 546 (holding that a "[f]ailure to raise futile objections 
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel"). 
Under rule 11(e), a trial court may not accept a guilty plea until it has 
made several enumerated findings, the purpose of which "is to ensure that a 
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defendant knows of his or her rights and thereby understands the basic 
consequences of a decision to plead guilty." State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, f 22, 
26 P.3d 203. When a trial court strictly complies with this rule 11(e) 
requirement, there- is "a presumption that the plea was voluntarily entered." 
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 11,1 P.3d 1108. 
"[D]espite the inflexibility implied by its label, [strict compliance] 
. . . allows a flexible approach to determining whether or not a defendant was 
informed of his rights" under rule 11(e). State v. Lovell 2011 UT 36, .f 79, 690 
Utah Adv. Rep. 13. "Verbatim recitation of the rights listed in rule 11(e) is not 
required, so long as the defendant was clearly and unequivocally informed of 
the rights he was waiving during the criminal proceeding in which he pled 
guilty." Id. at ^ 44. This "can be accomplished by multiple means so long as no 
requirement of the rule is omitted and so long as the record reflects that the 
requirement has been fulfilled/ " Id. at % 14 (quoting State v. lAaguire, 830 P.2d 
216,218 (Utah 1991)). For example, a district court's rule 11(e) findings may be 
based on "questioning of the defendant on the record," Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e); 
on "a properly incorporated plea affidavit," Lovell, 2011 UT 36, % 79; or on 
"other record proceedings before the trial court that [are] properly incorporated 
into the plea colloquy," id. at f 44. 
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An examination of the record of the October 22 plea hearing reveals that, 
contrary to Defendant's claim on appeal, the district court complied with the 
rule 11 requirements. 
i. Attorney Goodall correctly concluded that a rule 
11(e)(1) finding concerning unrepresented defendants 
was inapplicable because Defendant was represented 
by counsel at the October 22 plea hearing. 
Defendant first claims that "in violation of Rule 11(e)(1) the trial court 
never asked [him] whether he was satisfied with the advice and assistance of 
Mr. Warren/7 Aplt Brf. at 36. He contends that in moving to withdraw 
Defendant's guilty pleas, Mr. Goodall "failed to alert the court that the plea 
colloquy was insufficient under Rule 11 since the rule requires that the trial 
court ensure [Defendant] is represented by counsel, and the trial court never 
asked whether. . . Mr. Warren had represented his interests in this case." Aplt. 
Brf. at 41. This claim lacks merit. 
" [I]f [in taking a guilty plea] the defendant is not represented by counsel," 
rule 11(e)(1) requires the trial court to find that the defendant "has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel." Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(e)(1). The district court in this case was not required to make this finding, 
because Defendant was represented by Mr. Warren at the October 22 plea 
hearing. See R59,62,71. Indeed, Defendant had made it clear at the August 6 
pretrial conference that he " [did not] want to" represent himself in the case and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had not retained another attorney. R192:8. In light of these facts, the district 
court denied Mr. Warren's motion to withdraw as counsel until someone else 
made an appearance. R192:8-9. No one ever did. Accordingly, Mr. Warren 
remained as Defendant's counsel and appeared on his behalf at the October 22 
plea hearing. Moreover, Mr. Warren expressly certified in the plea affidavit that 
he was Defendant's attorney, and Defendant attested therein that he was 
"satisfied with the advice and assistance of [Mr. Warren]." R58-59.8 
Defendant claims that in not inquiring as to whether Mr. Warren was 
representing his interests in the case, the district court also failed to comply with 
rule 11(a). This claim is frivolous. First, the rule 11(a) requirement is not among 
those factors addressed in rule 11(e). See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). Second, rule 
11(a) governs the proceedings at arraignment: 
Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in 
open court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the 
defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(a). And third, even if rule 1.1(a) applied to Defendant's plea, 
the record conclusively establishes that Defendant had a reasonable time to 
confer with counsel. As discussed, the plea offer was made by the February 26, 
2004 preliminary hearing date and the plea was entered nearly eight months 
As explained, infra, at 35-38, the plea affidavit was properly incorporated 
at the October 22 plea hearing. 
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later. During that time, Defendant not only conferred with Mr. Warren but also 
Ms. Gustin. See R36-37a,43,54-61,71,99; R192:3-5. 
ii. Attorney Goodall correctly concluded that the district 
court strictly complied with rule 11(e)(3), thereby 
ensuring that Defendant knew of his right to compel 
the attendance of witnesses. 
Defendant also claims that the district court"failed to strictly comply with 
Rule 11 [(e)(3)] since it failed to inform [him] that if he desired to proceed to trial 
he would have the right to compel witnesses in his defense/7 Aplt. Brf. at 37. 
He contends that Mr. Goodall performed deficiently when he did not alert the 
district court to this alleged failure in moving to withdraw Defendant's guilty 
pleas. See Aplt. Brf. at 41. This claim likewise lacks merit. 
Before a trial court accepts a guilty plea, rule 11(e)(3) requires the court to 
find, among other things, that "the defendant knows of . . . the right to compel 
the attendance of defense witnesses/7 The district court in this case did not 
specifically discuss that right during its plea colloquy. See R71. But as 
explained, a trial court's rule 11(e) finding may also be based on "a properly 
incorporated plea affidavit.77 Lovell, 2011 UT 36, f 79; accord Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(e) (providing that a trial court's rule 11(e) findings "may be based on . . . a 
written statement reciting these factors77). The plea affidavit submitted by 
Defendant in this case was properly incorporated and "clearly and 
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unequivocally" informed Defendant of his right to compel the attendance of 
defense witnesses. See Lovell, 2011 UT 36, ^ 79. 
The submission of a plea affidavit is, of course, "only the starting point." 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,1313 (Utah 1987). The trial court must ensure that 
the rights in question are adequately explained in the plea affidavit. See State v. 
Lehi, 2003 UT App 212, W l - 1 6 , 73 P.3d 985 (concluding that the plea affidavit 
was insufficient because it was ambiguous in describing the elements of the 
offense). The court must also "establish[ ] that the defendant has read, 
understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement." Utah R. d i m . P. 
11(e). A review of the record reveals that the affidavit adequately explained 
Defendant's right to compulsory process and that the affidavit was properly 
incorporated at the plea hearing. 
On page 3 of the plea affidavit, Defendant acknowledged his right to 
compulsory process: 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a 
trial, I could call witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to 
obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those 
witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, 
the State would pay the costs. 
R56. The plea affidavit thus "contained] [a] statement[] that clearly and 
unequivocally instructed] the defendant," Lovell, 2011 UT 36, ^ 39, of his "right 
to compel the attendance of defense witnesses," as required under rule 11(e)(3). 
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Moreover, the affidavit was properly incorporated at the plea hearing. 
First, after establishing that a plea affidavit had been prepared, the district court 
verified with Defendant's attorney that he had reviewed it with Defendant and 
that the attorney believed Defendant understood it: 
Court: And you've discussed this matter with your 
client, Mr. Warren? 
Def. Counsel: Yes, your Honor. 
Court: Do you believe he understands the contents of 
the document that's there in front of him? 
Def. Counsel: I do. 
R71:3. In signing the plea affidavit, Defendant's attorney also attested that he 
knew Defendant had read the affidavit or that he read it to him, and again 
expressed his belief that Defendant "understands the meaning of its contents." 
R59. 
The district court also verified with Defendant during the plea colloquy 
that he had read the plea affidavit and understood the rights explained in it: 
Court: Anything you've read about in the statements in 
front of you that you do not understand? 
Defendant: No, I understand them. 
R71:13. Then, after asking counsel for both parties whether they had any further 
inquiries, the district court said to Defendant, "[Y]ou may sign the statement if 
you choose." R7T.13. The Defendant did so. See R71:13; 59. The district court 
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thereafter accepted Defendant's guilty pleas and found that they were "freely, 
knowingly, and voluntarily made." R61; R71:13-14. 
* * * 
In sum, the record before the trial court in this case, consisting of the plea 
colloquy and the properly incorporated plea affidavit, "contained] statements 
that clearly and unequivocally instruct[ed] the defendant of the rights listed in 
rule 11(e)." See Lovell, 2011 UT 36, t 39. Mr. Goodall, therefore, reasonably 
concluded that the trial court "fully complied" with rule 11 and thus did not 
perform deficiently when he.so stipulated at the hearing on the motion to 
withdraw the guilty pleas. 
b. In any event, Defendant has not demonstrated that absent 
the alleged error, the result would have been different. 
Because counsel did not perform deficiently, this Court need not reach the 
prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis. See Stiickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (holding 
that "there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim.. . to 
address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient 
showing on one"). Nevertheless, a review of the record reveals that Defendant 
has likewise failed to demonstrate prejudice. 
In claiming prejudice, Defendant argues that "there is a reasonable 
probability that had the noncompliance with Rule 11 been brought to light, the 
trial court would have allowed [Defendant] to withdraw his guilty pleas." Aplt. 
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Brf. at 43. That is the sum and substance of Defendant's prejudice claim. It fails 
for several reasons. First, Defendant's prejudice claim is inadequately briefed. 
It is a bald assertion of prejudice bereft of analysis or citation to legal authority. 
This Court will not address such inadequately briefed claims. See State v. 
Nielsen, 2011 UT App 211, % 5, 257 P.3d 1103 (holding that "this court will not 
address issues that are inadequately briefed"). 
Second, Defendant's articulation of the prejudice inquiry is incorrect. 
Defendant frames the prejudice inquiry as focusing on the probability of success 
on the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas had counsel raised the rule 11 
claims. See Aplt. Brf. at 43. But that is not the proper focus of the prejudice 
inquiry. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court almost two decades ago, 
"[wjhere a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, he or she must show a 'reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's errors, lie would not have pleaded guilty and would liave insisted on going to 
trial: " Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,525 (Utah 1994) (quoting Hill v. Lockliart, 
474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)) (emphasis added); accord Dean, 2004 UT 63, | 22. 
Third, Defendant has not made the required showing of prejudice. 
Nowhere has Defendant claimed that but for the alleged failure to advise him of 
his right to compulsory process, he would not have pled guilty. And indeed, to 
do so would not have been rational —by pleading, he averted the risk of being 
-38-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
found guilty of 20 third degree felony counts of dealing in harmful material to a 
minor. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473,1485 (2010) (holding that a in a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner "must convince the court 
that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the 
circumstances"). 
In sum, Defendant has failed to meet either prong of the Strickland test for 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. He has demonstrated neither deficient 
performance nor prejudice. Accordingly, his ineffective assistance claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted October 19, 2011. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
*Y S. GRAY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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U.S. Const, amend. VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1994) 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to 
conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only 
upon good cause shown and with leave of the court. 
•(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is 
made by motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry 
of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned 
person under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004) 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to 
conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon 
leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except 
for a plea held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before 
sentence is announced. Sentence may not be announced unless 
the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to 
withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading 
guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time 
period specified in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 
78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (2004) 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall 
be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in 
open court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the 
defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not 
guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant 
may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of 
insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation 
fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of 
the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall 
forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be 
given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than felonies the 
court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for 
making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or 
guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court 
has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has 
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of 
innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right 
to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront 
and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right 
to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering 
the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of 
the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is 
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually 
committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is 
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otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the 
minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a 
plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and 
plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing 
any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is 
limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on 
the record or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after 
the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, 
and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant 
cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the 
statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not 
required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral 
consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any 
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the 
ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 11-
13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other 
party has agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea 
to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the 
agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court. 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, 
the court shall advise the defendant personally that any 
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to 
any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the 
judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the 
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tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for 
tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting 
attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will 
be approved. 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not 
be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the 
defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or 
withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, 
a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and 
mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on 
appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination 
of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on 
appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in 
addition to the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a 
hearing within a reasonable time to determine if the defendant is 
mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
A-4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM B 
Statement of Defendant in Support of 
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel 
(R54-61) 
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••HIS USTUCT G i l l ] 
Third Judiolaf DSstrSct 
OCT 2 2 2004 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
0, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTEFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. /) ? T7f)*»/p'3 €> 
I, Hdcrf'/''i /A<Mf)^i4//)&f/heTQby acknowledge and certiiy that I have been 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
7m' ry/e.fj'^q 
Degree 
z 
<& 
Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
^jimi fri'^ + 4,/j@/0£££ 
l 
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I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty (or no contest). 
The_elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty, (or nacontest) are: 
/Jmc<fA J/r?4kn?j$J^ /k/^/nr-M/^r 'A- AJhQ^ &rf /ftrfrTZu* 
AJ/A/J^ /D/A/PA /=z>/g.. rite /yi/b&s /?/^ &xirfhL /bO?z&4r -
0F /9/H PffcvsJ* 
Thtr^, &»' ^ fe¥rr^(^'0 /^fp^Tlv^/d^-
fl-f /hyp*** /J/rr& T2fc /k/rt&r-TO fiXhsSz. ^f'M^^/h^ATjne^r^ 
/hjn n^ /HhJeA to/jfx A/tor'tirc Qth**rty M/M- MA//)/A •//» Y ^ 
I understand that by pleading^guiltyT%ill be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept niy guilty 
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or 
ng contest): 
•iif&S &hin *frm?/?!/?7., /$V ^Ajti&jA/U Yr~ TIP /9-/7?/A/P^: ' 
/h \/f ~fZ/ &A/&&n&> /A/ 2/g'x/Mh^ /Qry~/i//7^ t</s/?rti Ajfe 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
» • 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: . 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand 
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that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed 
lawyer's service to me. 
I (have not)«{?have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, 
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that 
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and ciimes to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is,m^p^J\/ J4J&£$£,k/. 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and 
b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to 
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses 
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony 
of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would 
pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to 
have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose 
not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also 
know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal 
to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty 
(or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged 
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead unot guilty," and my 
case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each 
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element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial is before a jury, the verdict 
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). I understand that if I wish 
to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is 
entered. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving 
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or 
both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of 
a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each 
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no 
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was 
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
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Plea agreement. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of 
a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those 
explained below: . 
i/L^ 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with die advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am<2£2 years of age. I have attended school through the / Z^ grade. I can read 
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the 
influence of any drag, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing 
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
>S 
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must 
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand 
that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be 
made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest I will only be allowed to withdraw 
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any 
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. ^ ^ / ^ L . 
'-it . a^^ Dated this ay of • , / j S f c ^ • • ilGFA 
DEFENDANT 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney ioi.QC^ff ^> /^//f^^tJlj^m defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of u±t crime(s) and the factual synopsis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in f^Ee foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true. 
A T T S E H E Y F0RT5EFENDANT 
Bar No: 7 7 1 7 
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
3& )X \J^A Afa^ JNJ^N , defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of 
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion 
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained 
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before 
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the 
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
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Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, 
knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's gui) 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered: 
(er no contest)-ftlea(s) to the 
Dated this 2^" day of _ 0C7C&CK 
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ADDENDUM C 
August 6,2004 Pretrial Conference Transcript 
(R192) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SCOTT C. WADSWORTH, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 031908633 FS 
Appellate Case No. 20100004 
MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL AUGUST 6, 2004 
BEFORE 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURT* 
NOV 2 3 2010 
'XQlQOOQV-M 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT T R A N S C R I B E R . ^ „ m i C T c i s l i T 
1775 East Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 2 2 2CS0 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
nvo 
Dsptity C!er£{ 
4^-
>•? ^ % 
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APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: PAUL PARKER 
Deputy District Attorney 
For the Defendant: BARTON J. WARREN 
Attorney at Law 
* * * 
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please? 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - AUGUST 5, 2004 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. WARREN: Can we call the Scott Wadsworth matter 
I believe it's number 18. 
MR. PARKER: Paul Parker for the State. 
MR. WARREN: Barton Warren on behalf of Mr. 
Wadsworth who is present. 
THE COURT: Okay. Just a minute. The State of 
Utah vs. Scott C. Wadsworth, 031908633. It's on for pre-
trial. We have a trial set for next Tuesday. I see. there's 
a stipulated motion to continue. What's all this about? 
MR. WARREN: Your Honor, what's happened, I can 
give a thumbnail sketch, but essentially what's happened is 
we were here for an anticipated change of plea back on the 
7th of May. After that hearing, I was advised by my client 
that it was his intention to at least seek a second opinion 
and retain other counsel. As the motion indicates, he 
subsequently retained Suzanne Gustin. 
THE COURT: She says it didn't. 
MR. WARREN: Pardon me? 
THE COURT: Ms. Gustin says she was never retained 
to represent him in this case. 
MR. WARREN: Well, Ms. Gustin contacted my office 
and discussed the case with me and it was my understanding 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 that she had been retained. I'm not privy to that, Your 
2 Honor. I don't know. What I do know, Judge, is that I later 
3 received a telephone call - a telephone message from Ms. 
4 Gustin indicating that Mr. Wadsworth had not been in contact 
5 with her. I asked him what we should do. I subsequently 
6 J left him a couple voice mail messages for Mr. Wadsworth. I 
wrote to him. When I received no response to those, I wrote 
to him on the, first the 12th of July indicating that he 
-3-J should---le-t~me-taow--what---was--g-oi-n-g--on--. It- was--my--
10 J understanding that I was going to be replaced as his attorney 
11 I and then I wrote to him again on the 20th of July indicating 
12 the same thing. I had not heard from Mr. Wadsworth -
13 THE COURT: Did Mr. Wadsworth contact you? 
14 I MR. WARREN: Mr. Wadsworth and I had the first 
15 I conversation since May 7th about 36 hours ago, Wednesday 
16 evening. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. So he hasn't bothered to stay in 
18 touch with you on this - these multiple charges. Yeah? All 
19 I right. Well, the State's the one that wants the continuance. 
2 0 MR. WARREN: Yes, Your Honor.' 
21 MR. PARKER: Thank you, Your Honor. This is Mr. 
22 Kendall's case. I believe he outlined some of the reasons 
23 including that he has the case manager gone and unable to be 
24 I at trial. Mr. Kendall also has left the state [inaudible]. 
25 THE COURT: I'm aware of that. 
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MR. WARREN: Your Honor, my client indicates to me 
that he has signed a retainer agreement with Ms. Gustin and 
he can elaborate. I'm not privy to that obviously. It's my 
understanding that she was going to replace me as counsel. 
THE COURT: Let me see it. 
MR. WADSWORTH: I didn't bring it with me, Your 
Honor. But I did - I retained her back on May 24th, just 
o o v o x. a. JL w<3<3.rvo Q I L C I 
THE COURT: Well, why would Ms. Gustin call this 
court and explain to my clerk that under no circumstances was 
she representing you in this case? 
MR. WADSWORTH: Well, originally what she was going 
to do was as Mr. Warren has stated, we were going to - I - I 
wanted to see some evidence and we had a conversation about a 
month and a half ago. She had given me her recommendations -
THE COURT: I don't care about any of that. Why 
would Ms. Gustin call this court yesterday and say that she 
did not represent you if you signed a retainer agreement with 
her? 
MR. WADSWORTH: Well, I have it at home. I could 
bring it back to - I mean, I didn't realize -
THE COURT: Where is she? 
MR. WADSWORTH: What's that? 
THE COURT: If she's representing you, I don't see 
her here. 
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MR. WADSWORTH: No, she said she would not appear 
in court today. That's what she -.we had a conversation 
several days ago and I said - I said, well - what she told me 
a month ago she says - she says I am, you know, she's 
pregnant obviously and she says there's no way I'll be able 
to go to trial on this on the 6th or rhe 7th, whatever today 
is. And I said, Well, gosh, if I had known that, you know, 
why didn't you tell me that to begin with? I didn't realize 
she was pregnant. I - I couldn't tell. And I said, Well, 
what am I going to do here, you know? She said I'm not going 
to represent - I'm not going to be able to represent and then 
she says, let me give you some phone numbers of some people 
in my office, you know, her associates. I said that's fine. 
She never called me back with any names and I get in contact 
with her several days ago and I says, you know, what are we 
going to do? We got to go to court in a few days. I, you 
know, I'm kind of left hanging here and really I paid her a 
hefty fee and retained her for things that we had agreed upon 
and she was supposed to contact Bill Kendall probably over a 
month ago because I wanted to look at some evidence that was, 
you know, the evidence against me, and she never called me 
back again a±.ter tu&t poini. 
THE COURT: Get on the radio and see if Ms. 
Gustin's in the courthouse.' 
THE BAILIFF: So you want to have a [inaudible] on 
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Ms. Gustin? 
MR. 
THE 
THE 
WADSWORTH: But I do have a signed contract. 
COURT: Be quiet. Not getting any response? 
BAILIFF: Not any response, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. Do you have something else 
you want to say? 
MR. WADSWORTH: Well, I'm just saying I - I did 
retain her and I nave the checks to prove it. I have the 
contract that I signed and, you know, and I waited for -
after she gave me her recommendation back on - I contacted 
her within days of that, in fact, probably the next day. 
THE COURT: Well -
MR. WADSWORTH: But I contacted her last night. 
Yeah, it was June 17th, we had conversations a day or so 
after that after I received her letter. And I said, Well, 
you know, I'd like to see the evidence. And she said, Well, 
I've got to get a hold of Bill Kendall and that was the last 
that I heard from her. You know, and I waited for her to 
call me with that date. You know, I assumed that's what we 
•were going to do and as the time grew near. Barton email -
or sent me a letter in the mail, and that's when I said, you 
know, when I called and said, Hey, what's going on, you know, 
I - Mr. Barton knew that we were working all along. She 
contacted him within several days after I retained her. I 
don't know why she's saying I haven't retained her. She's 
7 
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been paid in full. 
THE COURT: I don't know, but you better get it-
straightened out, Mr. Wadsworth. 
MR. WADSWORTH: And I definitely want to. She was 
supposed to contact me back -
THE COURT: You better do more than want to or 
you'll be here representing yourself. 
MR. WADSWORTH: I don't want to do that. 
THE COURT: Well, the only reason I'm going to 
continue this is the State requested it, and I'm not 
impressed with the State's reasons either, but obviously no 
one is prepared to go to trial. 
MR. WARREN: Your Honor, in light of these 
developments, it would be my motion for leave to withdraw. 
THE COURT: No, you may not withdraw until 
somebody's in. 
MR. WARREN: I understand. 
THE COURT: Let's set a new trial date today. End 
of October - October 2 6th. 
MR. WARREN: October 26, Your Honor?. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. Pxn,RKER: That would be fine with the State. 
THE COURT: . Works on your calendar, Mr. Barton? 
MR. WARREN: Yes, Your Honor. Warren is my last 
name, sir. 
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1 I THE COURT: Well, I'll set another pretrial for the 
2 I 22nd of October at 9:00. 
3 I MR. WARREN: Trial was at 9:30 or 10:00, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: 9:30. 
MR. WARREN: Was that 9:00 on the 22nd, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes, this calendar. Mr. Barton in view-
MR. WARREN: Warren, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: - Mr. Wadsworth had some arrangement in 
this case and I'm not letting you out of this case until Ms. 
Gustin or somebody else makes an appearance because I'm not 
continuing this [inaudible] but anybody down here on the 22nd 
or the week before so I know we can't try this because I 
don't have a lawyer. Or if that's the case, I'll just make 
the determination that Mr. Wadsworth's not cooperating with 
his attorneys and I'll take him into custody and he'll set in 
jail until we try the case. Do I make myself clear? 
MR. WADSWORTH: Yes, sir. 
MR. WARREN: Yes, Your Honor. 
. . THE COURT: Trial for next Tuesday is stricken. 
MR. WARREN: Thank you, Your Honor. That's all I 
have this morning. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
-c-
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CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript in 
the before mentioned proceeding held Judge Timothy Hanson 
was transcribed by me from an audio recording 
and is a full, true and correct transcription of the 
requested proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages to 
the best of my ability. 
Signed November 3, 2010 in Sandy, Utah. 
Carolyn'Erickson 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Certified Court Transcriber 
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ADDENDUM D 
Affidavits of Susanne Gustin-Furgis and Scott Wadsworth 
(R99,H5-16) 
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AFFIPAVtrOFSUSANWEGUSTlN-FCrRGTS 
STATE V. SCOTT WADSWORTH 
1. I was hired on May 27,2004 lo represent Scott Wadsworth for the limited 
scope of reviewing a pica offer he had received from ihc state to settle his 
case. 
2. i was aware that Barton Warren was his attorney-of-record an the ease. Mr. 
Wadsrwotth was informed that b&cause of Mr. Warren'K stains as his f^tjShicy-
ftf-record, I would have to inform Mr. Warren of my role in the case, 
inform Mr. Warren that I would be reviewing the case in %HL of Lhe plea offer 
by the stale, 
3. On May 27, 2004, "Mr. Wada worth and 1 signed a standardized fee agreement 
The agreement reflects our understanding that the amount of S5.000 was a 
"flat fee.'1 The amount was not. a "retainer/" which is also reflected ill the fee 
ajrarmoril. 
4. Beeauae of all of the above, I did not file an ttppearanccf uf counsel hi the case, 
5. Written and oral correspondence with Mr. Wadswoith redacted the limited 
seope of my representation in the case, 
6. On June 17, 2004,1 provided to S wli Wfcdsworth a written analysis of his 
caae and also provided a legal opinion about the case. 
7. Mr. Wads worth did desire to further retain my services as trial counsel on the 
matter, but no agreement was ever reached or znujr&l into between Mr. 
Wadsworlh aa<l xne, 
8. The last contact I had with Mr. Wadsworth on this case was in July of 2004. 
DATED tki^P^day of January, 2005. 
SIIJ*!fffi GUSIIN-PURGIS 
f 
3
' *
l d
 S339ir?~:Dl :UaHJ b2 r : iR nfiF.T 
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PETER D. GOODALL #9718 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
F E S
 - 7 2005 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SiAibOl^ UlAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SCOTT C. WADSWORTH, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT WADSWORTH 
Case No. 031908633 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Scott C. Wadsworth, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. My name is Scott Wadsworth. I am over 18 years of age and fully competent to 
testify as a witness at trial. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein. 
2. I had retained Barton Warren, Attorney at Law, to represent me in the instant case. 
3. As the case progressed, I lost confidence in Mr. Warren's ability to represent my 
interests at trial. 
4. I then attempted to retain Susanne Gustin-Furgis to represent me through the 
remainder of the case. 
1 
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5. The attached "Fee Agreement" was entered into between Susanne Gustm-Furgis 
and myself. 
6. The first page of said "Fee Agreement" is a true and correct copy of the document 
I received from Ms. Gustin-Furgis. 
7. The second page is not executed but otherwise details the remainder of the 
agreement. 
8. 
9. 
Court. 
I am unable to locate the second page of the agreement as executed. 
I understood that Ms. Gustin-Furgis would represent me in the Third District 
10. I paid Susanne Gustin-Furgis $5,000 for her representation and was unable, until 
recently, to afford to pay another retainer. 
DATED this^T^" day of February, 2005. 
SCOTT WADSWORTH 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this t1^ day of February, 2005. 
My Commission Expires: 
M&^kk MOTOY PUBLIC -STATE OFUTMt 
l & m 175 E*ST400 SOUTH 5TE4Q& 
11B8M * SALT LAKE CITY UTWIU 
fcfa, rnmm. EXP. 03/30/2007 _ x u + n ^ r B ^ u i ^ ^ ~JA .CU.. ~~*A n i uunv^ ^LLLanu iu i ^aiu ^ u u i u j cuiu o u u c 
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ADDENDUM E 
Stipulated Motion to Continue 
(R43-44) 
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DAVIDE.YOCOM : ' • ' 
District Attorney for Salt Lake Comity (jq j r p g •->•• ~. 
WILLIAMK. KENDALL, 7906 \ ' U * 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
SCOTT WADSWORTH, 
Defendant. 
STIPULATED MOTION TO CONTINUE 
Case No. 031908633 
Hon. Timothy R. Hanson 
WILLIAM K. KENDALL, attorney for plaintiff, moves this court to continue the Jury 
Trial in the above-entitled case which is set for the 10th day of August, 2004, at 9:00 AM, for the 
following reasons: 
1. Both parties have anticipated that this matter will resolve via a negotiated plea 
resolution. The defendant is represented by Mr. Barton Warren and waived his 
preliminary hearing based upon a plea offer made by the State. The defendant 
then hired Susanne Gustin-Furgis to offer him a second opinion with regard to 
the plea offer made by the State, and both Ms. Gustin-Furgis and Mr. Warren 
have recommended that the defendant accept the State's plea offer. However, 
despite numerous contact attempts, the defendant has not been in touch with 
his attorneys or the State to indicate his decision with regard to the plea offer. 
2. Ms. Gustin-Furgis has indicated that she will not represent the defendant at a 
trial in this case, and Mr. Warren has indicated that he will not be prepared to 
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proceed to trial as it is currently scheduled due to a lack of contact with the 
defendant and, thus, an inability to prepare for that trial. 
3. The State also will be unable to proceed to trial as currently scheduled due to 
the fact that it's case manager, an essential witness in this trial, will be out of 
town during the currently set trial dates. 
4. The State's attorney has spoken with Mr. Warren and he stipulates to this 
Motion to Continue the Jury Trial. 
DATED this 19th day of July, 2004. 
DAVID E.YOCOM 
District Attorne 
XIAM K. KENDALL 
Deputy District Attorney 
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ADDENDUM F 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
(R123-28) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 031908633 
vs. : 
SCOTT C. WADSWORTH, : 
Defendant* : 
Before the Court is the defendant's Motion to Withdraw his 
plea of guilt as entered to the Amended Information on October 22, 
2004. On that date, the final pretrial before the scheduled trial 
the following Tuesday, the defendant entered guilty pleas to Sexual 
Exploitation of a Minor, a Second Degree Felony; Unlawful Sexual 
Activity with a Minor, a Third Degree Felony; and Enticing a Minor 
Over the Internet, a Class A Misdemeanor. After reviewing the 
defendant's written statement wherein the rights that he was giving 
up as a result of his guilty plea were outlined, and the Court's 
oral colloquy with him, the Court accepted those pleas and struck 
the trial date. Prior to sentencing, the defendant obtained new 
counsel and filed a Motion to Withdraw his plea. That matter was 
last before the Court on February 7, 2 005, wherein the Court 
received Affidavits stipulated between the parties as admissible, 
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STATE V. WADSWORTH PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
and evidence in conjunction with this Motion to Set Aside the 
guilty pleas as being given involuntarily. 
Originally, the defendant questioned the adequacy of the Rule 
11 colloquy, but withdrew that argument prior to oral argument on 
this matter. 
The defendant now asserts that his plea was involuntary, 
because he had lost confidence in his attorney, Barton Warren, and 
was under the impression that attorney Susanne Gustin-Furgis would 
be representing him at trial. 
Current counsel for the defendant argues that even while the 
plea colloquy indicates that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly 
and without coercion of any type entered his plea of guilty, that 
he ought to be able to withdraw his plea based upon his unstated 
dissatisfaction with his attorney, Barton Warren. After hearing 
argument of counsel, the Court took the matter under advisement to 
examine the videotape of the August 6, 2 004, hearing where the 
Court discussed the issue of Ms. Gustin-Furgis1 representation of 
the defendant and continued the then-set trial date of August 6, 
2004, to October 26, 2004. 
.In reviewing the videotape of the proceedings on August 6, 
2 004, it is clear that the defendant, at least up to that point in 
time, was under the impression that he had retained Ms. Gustin-
Furgis to represent him. At that point in time, she had not made 
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STATE V. WADSWORTH PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
an appearance, no one produced a retainer agreement, and Ms. 
Gustin-Furgis had contacted the Court's clerk advising that she did 
not represent Mr. Wadsworth in these proceedings, but was only 
hired to provide him with a second opinion in relation to a plea 
offer that had been suggested by the State. 
While there certainly may have been some confusion regarding 
Mr. Wadsworth's understanding of whether or not Ms. Gustin-Furgis 
was going to represent him prior to the August 6, 2004, pretrial 
hearing, there could not have been any misunderstanding in Mr. 
Wadsworth's mind following that hearing. It was related to him by 
the Court that Ms. Gustin-Furgis had advised the Court that she did 
not represent him. Mr. Warren's request to withdraw was refused on 
the basis that new counsel had not appeared, and that unless new 
counsel appeared, he would not be allowed to withdraw in view of 
the then-new trial date setting of October 26, 2 004. The Court 
specifically advised Mr. Wadsworth that he needed to resolve his 
concerns regarding representation before the October trial setting, 
because the Court would not be inclined to continue the matter once 
again. 
Thereafter, nothing occurred until two working days before the 
trial, that is, the second final pretrial conference, when the 
Court was advised that there was a plea arrangement struck between 
the State and the defendant, Mr. Wadsworth. The State offered an 
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STATE V. WADSWORTH PAGE 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Amended Information which the Court accepted, to which the 
defendant did not object, and ultimately, after an exchange between 
the Court and Mr. Wadsworth regarding the rights that he was giving 
up if he decided to waive his right to trial and enter a guilty 
plea, this Court accepted those pleas and set the matter for 
sentencing. 
A review of the transcript of both the plea colloquy and the 
hearing on the August 6, 2 004, pretrial do not reveal that Mr. 
Wadsworth ever expressed any dissatisfaction, specifically or 
generally, with Mr. Warren. Certainly, he did not at the change of 
plea hearing express in arly fashion to the Court that he was 
offering the plea because he felt that he had no alternative, or 
that he was dissatisfied with the representation he had received 
from Mr. Warren. It is only now, after the fact, that Mr. 
Wadsworth suggests to this Court that he had lost confidence in the 
early part of the summer of 2 004 with Mr. Warren, and that he still 
had no confidence in Mr. Warren in October of 2 0 04, and entered his 
plea because he didn't think he had any other alternative. During 
the plea colloquy, there were numerous opportunities for -Mr. 
Wadsworth to suggest to the Court that his plea was not voluntary, 
but the record is devoid of any such suggestion. 
The Court is unwilling to set aside an otherwise voluntary-
appearing plea on the basis of unspecific allegations of 
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STATE V. WADSWORTH PAGE 5 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
dissatisfaction with one's lawyer after the plea is taken, but 
before sentencing is completed. The Court can find no legitimate 
basis to allow the defendant to withdraw the pleas that he has 
previously entered, and accordingly the Motion to Withdraw the Plea 
is denied. 
The defendant is ordered to immediately, upon receipt of the 
referral slip which is being sent to Mr. Goodall, defendant's 
current counsel, contact Adult Probation and Parole and make an 
appointment to meet with them, so that this Court might have a 
presentence evaluation report for the sentencing which is scheduled 
for Aiorilo \ 2 0 05, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. 
No formal Order is necessary, this Memorandum Decision and 
Order will stand as the Court's Order denying the defendant's 
Motion to Withdraw his plea. 
Dated this O day of February, 2005'.'-: 
IMOTHY R.«:, HANSON-; J 
DISTRICT COURTr'JUDGE 
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